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I. INTRODUCTION
For over a century, the common law of negligence has required that, before
liability can be imposed, a relationship exist between the breach of duty by the
defendant and the harm suffered by the plaintiff.' Essentially, this is a policy
decision-a recognition that liability cannot be open ended and should be limited to
conduct that played a sufficiently important role in causing the harm suffered.2 The
element of the negligence action charged with embodying and effectuating this
concept is "proximate cause."3 But while it is universally recognized that proximate
*Professor of Law, Touro College, Jacob D. Fuchsberg Law Center; J.D., Columbia
University School of Law (1980).
1W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 263 (5th ed. 1984).
2These policy considerations include: the practical necessity of limiting liability so as not
to impose an undue burden on the responsible party; the need to construct a system that is both
feasible to administer and predictable in result; the desirability of favoring or disfavoring
certain types of classes of defendants; the desirability of favoring or disfavoring certain
defenses; the desirability of spreading economic loss; and the desirability of accident
deterrence. 4 FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW OF TORTS 131-32 (2d ed. 1986).
3The term "proximate cause" is not the only term used to describe the concept under
discussion; "legal cause" is also used. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 431
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cause is a necessary element of a negligence action, historically there has been little
agreement on how the term should be defined or even conceptualized.'
This began to change in the mid-twentieth century when the myriad definitions of
proximate cause began to coalesce around the foreseeability based conceptualization
of result-within-the-risk.5 Just as a consensus began to emerge among courts and
commentators, however, the Restatement of Torts adopted the substantial factor
test-a view of proximate cause that focused on significance, as opposed to
foreseeability.6 Swift and harsh condemnation of the substantial factor test and its
corresponding minimizing of foreseeability came from many corners.7 Nonetheless,
the substantial factor formulation of proximate cause took root,8 and from the mid-
twentieth century on, it seemed as if American jurisprudence would be burdened
with two dueling, irreconcilable versions of proximate cause-the foreseeability
based result-within-the-risk version on the one hand, and the significance based
substantial factor version on the other.9
Most recently, however, the courts-the entities mandated to apply proximate
cause during the course of the analysis of liability for negligence-appear to have
brokered a peace between the dueling conceptualizations of proximate cause. As
applied, the proximate cause analysis grounded in substantial factor appears to be
(1965). However, for the reasons set forth below, this Article employs the term proximate
cause:
The term "proximate cause" is applied by the courts to those more or less undefined
considerations which limit liability even where the fact of causation is clearly
established .... It is an unfortunate word, which places an entirely wrong emphasis
upon the factor of physical or mechanical closeness. For this reason "legal cause" or
perhaps even "responsible cause" would be a more appropriate term. There is,
however, no present prospect that long ingrained practice will ever be altered by
substitution of either.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 273.
4Prosser states:
An essential element of the plaintiff s cause of action for negligence, or for that matter
for any other tort, is that there be some reasonable connection between the act or
omission of the defendant and the damage which the plaintiff has suffered. This
connection usually is dealt with by the courts in terms of what is called "proximate
cause," or "legal cause."
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 263 (citing a plethora of seminal authority ranging,
chronologically, from Francis H. Bohlen, The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the
Test of Liability in Negligence, 49 AM. LAW REG. 79 (1901), to E. Wayne Thode, Tort
Analysis: Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between
Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 1 (1977)).
5See infra notes 11-44 and accompanying text.
6See infra notes 45-63 and accompanying text.
7See infra notes 81-91 and accompanying text.
8See infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
9See, e.g., D.E. Buckner, Annotation, Foreseeability as an Element of Negligence and
Proximate Cause, 100 A.L.R.2d 942 § 1 (1965).
1004 [Vol. 56:1003
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yielding the same results with respect to liability as the proximate cause analysis
grounded in foreseeability.' 0
It is the thesis of this Article that such a peace has, in fact, been brokered;
whether approached from the means of substantial factor or result-within-the-risk,
the end is the finding of common ground for the purpose of the proximate cause
analysis. This Article first summarizes and analyzes the foreseeability based result-
within-the-risk approach to proximate cause. Next, the Article summarizes and
analyzes the substantial factor test. Finally, the Article explains and analyzes the
common ground that appears to have emerged between the two disparate approaches.
II. THE FORESEEABILITY BASED FORMULATION OF PROXIMATE CAUSE: RESULT-
WiTHIN-THE-RISK
A. Background
Historically, nothing has been more critical to the formulation of the negligence
action than the notion of foreseeability.1" Foreseeability affects the scope of the duty
owed at the outset"2 and the liability for the resulting consequences at the conclusion.
It is the latter notion-the notion that an actor's liability for negligence is limited by
the degree of the foreseeability of the consequences-that the term proximate cause
embodies. "3
'
0See sources cited infra notes 92-139 and accompanying text.
1 'See, e.g., 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 133; KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 280.
12For discussions of the relationship of duty to proximate cause, and how the concept of
duty can theoretically subsume the concept and limits potentially embodied in the notion of
proximate cause, see, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 249-51 (2000), 4 HARPER ET
AL., supra note 2, at 138-39; and KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 274-75 ("It is quite possible
to state every question which arises in connection with 'proximate cause' in the form of a
single question: was the defendant under a duty to protect the plaintiff against the event which
did in fact occur?").
130n this point, Prosser writes: "There is perhaps no other one issue in the law of torts
over which so much controversy has raged, and concerning which there has been so great a
deluge of legal writing." KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 280 (citing KEETON ET AL., supra
note 1, at 263 n.1; R.W.M. Dias, The Duty Problem in Negligence, 13 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 198
(1955); R.W.M Dias, The Breach Problem and the Duty of Care, 30 TUL. L. REV. 377 (1956);
John G. Fleming, The Passing of Polemis, 39 CAN. BAR REV. 489 (1961); A.L. Goodhart, The
Imaginary Necktie and the Rule in Re Polemis, 68 L.Q. REV. 514 (1952); A.L. Goodhart,
Liability and Compensation, 76 L.Q. REV. 567 (1960); Leon Green, Foreseeability in
Negligence Law, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 1401 (1961); Douglas Payne, The "Direct"
Consequences of a Negligent Act, 5 CURRENT LEG. PROB. 189 (1952); Douglas Payne,
Foreseeability and Remoteness of Damage in Negligence, 25 MOD. L. REV. 1 (1962);
Glanville Williams, The Risk Principle, 77 L. Q. REV. 179 (1961); Wilson and Slade, A Re-
examination of Remoteness, 15 MOD. L. REv. 458 (1952); Lord Wright, Re Polemis, 14 MOD.
L. REV. 393 (1951); LEON GREEN, RATIONALE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE (1927); Francis Bohlen,
The Probable or the Natural Consequence as the Test of Liability in Negligence, 49 AM. L.
REG. 79, 148 (1901); Joseph Walter Bingham, Some Suggestions Concerning "Legal Cause"
at Common Law, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 16, 136 (1909); Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions
of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 102, 233 (1911); Joseph Beale, The Proximate Consequences of an
Act, 33 HARV. L. REv. 633 (1920); Leon Green, Are Negligence and "Proximate" Cause
Determined by the Same Test, 1 TEX. L. REv. 224, 423 (1923); A. McLaughlin, Proximate
20081 1005
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In summing up the development of the relationship between foreseeability,
negligence, and the liability for its consequences, Harper, James and Gray rely upon
the writings of Holdsworth and Pollock.' 4 According to Holdsworth, the proximate
cause question that needed to be resolved was "whether any ordinarily prudent man
would have foreseen that damage would probably result from his act." 5 According
to Pollock, the question was whether the damage caused by a defendant's negligence
was "such as the defendant could reasonably be expected to anticipate."16
The most successful approach to proximate cause to emerge from these historical
underpinnings is the result-within-the-risk approach. Stated generally, this approach
to proximate cause "holds that a negligent defendant is liable for all the general kinds
of harms he foreseeably risked by his negligent conduct and to the class of persons
he put at risk by that conduct."' 7 More specifically, result-within-the-risk compares
the risk that made the defendant's conduct a breach of duty to three aspects of the
ensuing result-person, type, and manner. Most specifically, person, or person-
within-the-risk, focuses on whether the person who was ultimately injured by the
defendant's negligence was a foreseeable subject of the risk that made the
defendant's conduct a breach of duty to begin with. Type, or type-within-the-risk,
focuses on whether the type of injury ultimately inflicted by the defendant's
negligence was a foreseeable kind of harm threatened from the risk that made the
defendant's conduct a breach of duty to begin with. Finally, and perhaps most
Cause, 39 HARv. L. REV. 149 (1925); Leon Green, Are There Dependable Rules of Causation,
77 U. PA. L. REV. 601 (1929); Charles E. Carpenter, Workable Rules for Determining
Proximate Cause, 20 CAL. L. REV. 229, 396, 471 (1932); William Prosser, The Minnesota
Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REV. 19 (1936); Richard V. Campbell, Duty, Fault
and Legal Cause, 1938 Wis. L. REV. 402 (1938); Charles Gregory, Proximate Cause in
Negligence - A Retreat from Rationalization, 6 U. Cii. L. REV. 36 (1938); Charles E.
Carpenter, Proximate Cause, 14 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 115, 416 (1940); Charles E. Carpenter,
Proximate Cause, 15 S. CAL. L. REV. 187, 304, 427 (1942); Charles E. Carpenter, Proximate
Cause, 16 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 61, 275 (1942); Herbert Morris, Proximate Cause in Minnesota,
34 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1950); Leon Green, Proximate Cause in Texas Negligence Law, 28
TEx. L. REV. 71, 621, 755 (1950); William Prosser, Proximate Cause in California, 38 CAL. L.
REV. 369 (1950); Fleming James, Jr. and Roger F. Perry, Legal Cause, 60 YALE L.J. 761
(1951); John Sherman Myers, Causation and Common Sense, 5 U. MIAMI L.Q. 238 (1951);
Clarence Morris, Duty, Negligence and Causation, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 189 (1952); Roscoe
Pound, Causation, 67 YALE L.J. 1 (1957); Glanville Williams, Causation in the Law, 1961
CAMBRIDGE L.J. 62; Leon Green, The Causal Relation Issue in Negligence Law, 60 MICH. L.
REV. 543 (1962); R. KEETON, LEGAL CAUSE IN THE LAW OF TORTS (1963); H.L.A. Hart,
Varieties of Legal Responsibility, 83 L.Q. REV. 346 (1967); E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis:
Duty-Risk v. Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and
Jury, 1977 UTAHL. REV. 1 (1977)).
This article does not wish to add to the deluge. Rather, the article seeks to summarize
aspects of the concept of foreseeability based proximate cause only to the extent necessary to
compare them to the substantial factor approach to proximate cause, infra.
144 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 133.
151d. (quoting 8 SIR WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 450 (2d ed.
1937)).
161d. at 133-34 (quoting SIR FREDERICK POLLOCK, THE LAW OF TORTS 24 (15th ed. 1951)).
17DOBBS, supra note 12, at 444.
1006 [Vol. 56:1003
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significantly, manner, or manner-within-the-risk, focuses on whether the way the
injury was ultimately inflicted by the defendant's negligence was a foreseeable way
of inflicting an injury created by the risk that made the defendant's conduct a breach
of duty to begin with.' s
B. Person- Within-the-Risk
The seminal case regarding person-within-the-risk is Palsgraf v. Long Island Rail
Company. 9 Mrs. Palsgraf, the plaintiff, was standing on the defendant's railroad
platform. While she was waiting, a train began to leave the station, and a man,
carrying a package wrapped in newspaper, jumped aboard. As guards on the train
attempted to steady him, the package the man was carrying fell onto the tracks. The
package, which contained fireworks, exploded. The shock from the explosion
knocked down some scales that had been placed on the platform, injuring Mrs.
Palsgraf. Nothing in the appearance of the package indicated that it contained any
explosive material.2" Writing for the majority, Justice Cardozo held that while the
defendant railroad was negligent, it was not liable to the particular plaintiff (Mrs.
Palsgraf) who suffered the injury. Specifically, Justice Cardozo stated that "[t]he
conduct of the defendant's guard, if a wrong in its relation to the holder of the
package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away.
Relatively to her it was not negligence at all."'" Although the case conceptualized its
analysis in terms of the scope of the duty owed,22 it has subsequently been enshrined
as the seminal case establishing that person-within-the-risk is a critical component of
'
8See generally KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 280-90; DOBBS, supra note 12, at 453-58,
463-70.
19Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R. Co., 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
2
°Id. at 99.
211d"
221d. at 99-101. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 284-85 ("In 1928 something of a
bombshell burst upon this field, when the New York Court of Appeals, forsaking 'proximate
cause,' stated the issue of foreseeability in terms of duty."); DOBBS, supra note 12, at 456
n.12.
20081 1007
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proximate cause.23  The concept of person-within-the-risk has been applied
continuously since the publication of this 1928 opinion.
24
C. Type-Within-the-Risk
The seminal cases regarding type-within-the-risk are Overseas Tankship (U.K.),
Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng 'g Co. (Wagon Mound)25 and Hughes v. Lord Advocate.26
In Wagon Mound, a ship negligently discharged oil into Sydney Harbor. The oil
had a very high flash point and, as such, presented a foreseeable risk of fouling the
plaintiff's timber warf and interfering with shipping, but no foreseeable risk of fire.
Nonetheless, a fire, and damage to the warf therefrom, resulted when molten metal
from a nearby welding operation ignited cotton debris floating beneath the oil, which
in turn achieved the necessary flash point and ignited the oil. Ultimately, the court
found that the plaintiffs were not liable for the damages caused by the fire. The court
reasoned that the foreseeable harm from the negligent discharge of oil was the harm
that could be described as fouled docks, etc., and that liability should not extend to
the unforeseeable harm caused by the fire. 7
23See DOBBS, supra note 12, at 455-56:
The Palsgraf illustration: class of persons at risk. The most famous American case on
proximate cause (or almost anything) is grounded in the same basic idea that liability
should be limited to risks created by the defendant's negligent conduct....
Since the unreasonable risk created by the defendant was a risk to the passenger, or at
most to a very small circle of persons who might have been close enough to be injured
if he fell, it created no recognizable risk at all to Mrs. Palsgraf. As Judge Cardozo
said, "Relatively to her it was not negligence at all," so the defendant was not liable.
Although Cardozo did not express this result as a rule of proximate cause, the outcome
it dictates is the outcome of a proximate cause rule based on risk or foreseeability rule.
"[T]he orbit of the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigilance" marked the
scope of liability.
See also 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 138-39.
24DOBBS, supra note 12, at 457; 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 138 ("The view
currently prevailing in this country, however, does limit the scope of the duty to do or refrain
from doing a given act to (1) those persons that are likely to be endangered by the act or
omission, and (2) harm (to such person or interest) from a risk the likelihood of which made
the act or omission negligent.") (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281(b), cmts c, e,
f (1965); Id. §§ 442A, 442B; Id. at Appendix (to § 281) 305-309 (Reporter's Notes), (to §§
442A, 442B) 201-204 (Reporter's Notes) (1966)); Id. at note 11; Buckner, supra note 9, at §§
4, 5A; KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 284-89.
25Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Morts Dock & Eng'g Co. (The Wagon Mound),
[1961] A.C. 388 (P.C. 1960) (appeal taken from Sup. CT. NSW).
26Hughes v. Lord Advocate, [1963] A.C. 837 (H.L).
27Wagon Mound, [1961] A.C. 388; DOBBS, supra note 12, at 454-57. As expounded upon
by Dobbs:
Under English authority existing up until that time, it would have been possible to
reason that the defendant should be liable for the fire because there were no new
independent causes of it; the defendant was a direct cause and that would have been
enough for liability. But the Privy Council adopted the risk rule instead. It held that
liability for negligence was to be coextensive with the negligence. If the defendant
negligently created a risk of harm B. The Privy Council thought that since the only
harm foreseeable from negligent discharge of the oil was harm in the nature of fouled
1008 [Vol. 56:1003
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In Hughes, workmen who broke for tea left an open manhole guarded only by
paraffin lamps and covered only by a tent. Two boys came upon the site and began
exploring it. Ultimately, one of the boys, while inside the manhole, was burned
when he touched a metal ladder that had been heated by the flames of one of the
paraffin lamps after it too had fallen inside the hole. In this case, the court found that
the defendants were liable for the bums sustained by the boy, even though contact
with the source of heat may have came about in an unforeseeable way."8 The court
reasoned that the harm that was foreseeable with respect to the negligence associated
with the paraffin lamps was the same kind of harm-a burn-that resulted. As stated
by Lord Guest: "I cannot see that these are two different types of accident. They are
both burning accidents and in both cases the injuries would be burning injuries.""
Though not using the specific nomenclature of type-within-the-risk, these cases
established that the type of injury suffered is another of the critical components of
result-within-the-risk based proximate cause.
30
D. Manner-Within-the-Risk
There are a number of critical cases that developed the notion of manner-within-
the-risk; one of those most directly focused on the concept is Doughty v. Turner
Manufacturing Company.3' In Doughty, a worker knocked an asbestos lid into a vat
containing 800 degrees centigrade liquid. The vat cover underwent a chemical
change, and the change produced water and steam that caused an eruption of the
molten liquid, splashing the plaintiff. The court declined to impose liability on the
defendant, reasoning that the way the liquid reached the plaintiff-propelled by a
chemical reaction as opposed to a simple splash caused by the impact of the lid
hitting the liquid-was unforeseeable. As such, the case is clearly focused on
manner-within-the-risk.32
The other seminal cases discussed in this section can also be integrated into the
development of manner-within-the-risk. For example, Mrs. Palsgraf, along with not
docks, the defendant should not be liable for the entirely unforeseeable harm caused
by fire. One way to express the idea is to say that, as to the fire, the defendant created
no unreasonable risk and hence as to the fire, the defendant was not negligent at all.
American cases are overwhelmingly consistent with this rule, although their manner of
expression is often slightly different.
Id. at 455.
28Hughes, [ 1963] A.C. 837; 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 134-36, n.6.
29Hughes, [1963] A.C. 837.
3°DOBBS, supra note 12, at 457:
Classes of persons and classes of risks. Palsgraf differs from Wagon Mound in detail
but not in fundamental thrust. The fundamental thrust is that liability for negligence is
limited to the risks negligently created by the defendant. The difference in detail is
that the risk at issue in Wagon Mound could be described as a risk of a certain type or
class of harm, while the risk at issue in Palsgraf could be described as a risk to a
certain class of person. Many, many common law cases are consistent with the scope
of risk rules both in the language of foreseeability and in their results.
See also, Buckner, supra note 9, at §§ 4-5.
31Doughty v. Turner Mfg Co., [1964] 1 QB 518.
32Id.; 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 135-37, n.6.
2008] 1009
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being a person within the risk, was not injured in a foreseeable manner when viewed
from the perspective of the defendant railroad. (One could argue a different
conclusion regarding the man who carried the package of fireworks.) Similarly, in
Wagon Mound, the timber warf was damaged in a manner that was unforeseeable
from the perspective of the defendant working with oil characterized by a high flash
point.
The question of emphasis is also important. In Hughes, for example, the manner
in which the boy was burned is arguably not foreseeable, but the court appeared to be
more focused on type. By contrast, type is certainly present in Doughty, but that
court was more focused on manner.
Regardless of these vagaries and vicissitudes, however, Palsgraf Wagon Mound,
Hughes, and certainly Doughty have enshrined manner-within-the-risk as a critical
part of the result-within-the-risk proximate cause analysis. 3
E. The Special Case of Intervening Cause
Intervening cause cases arise when one defendant negligently creates a risk of
harm, but a subsequent force-often a second, negligent defendant, i.e., an
intervening actor-is the immediate cause of the harm.34 Historically, intervening
cause cases posed two significant issues in the proximate cause context.
The first issue was whether the sequence of events should not only be relevant to,
but controlling of, the proximate cause analysis. For a time, pursuant to the "direct
cause" view of proximate cause, this question was answered in the affirmative.35
The quintessential illustration of the direct cause view is the case of In re Polemis.3 6
In Polemis, benzene vapors accumulated in the hold of a ship. Subsequently, an
employee of the defendant negligently caused a plank to drop into the hold, creating
a spark which exploded the vapor and destroyed the ship. Despite the fact that the
resulting explosion was in no way foreseeable from the perspective of the actor
33See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 12, at 466-69. Regarding manner-within-the-risk generally,
Dobbs states:
Manner of injury rule. The defendant is liable for harms he negligently caused so long
as a reasonable person in his position should have recognized or foreseen the general
kind of harm the plaintiff suffered. He is not ordinarily relieved of liability merely
because the manner of injury or its details were unforeseeable.
Id. § 189 at 466.
Regarding Hughes specifically, Dobbs states:
Examples. If the defendant negligently leaves kerosene where it might be ignited and
bum the plaintiff, the fact that ignition unforeseeably triggered an explosion rather
than a burning is of no consequence. The general type of accident was foreseeable,
and from a known source of harm; the explosion is a mere "variant of the
foreseeable."
Id. See also 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 139; Buckner, supra note 9, at § 5.
34KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 301; DOBBS, supra note 12, at 460; 4 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 147-54.
35KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 293-97; DOBBS, supra note 12, at 458; 4 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 147.
361n re Polemis and Furness, Withy & Co., [1921] 3 K.B. 560.
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dropping the plank, recovery was allowed against the defendant because the act
directly led to the explosion. 7
After being the subject of much debate and criticism, 38 Polemis was subsequently
overruled-and the direct cause view largely repudiated-by Wagon Mound, which,
as stated earlier, was one of several critical cases establishing the importance of
foreseeability to the proximate cause analysis.39 More specifically, Wagon Mound
replaced sequence of events with foreseeability as the operative concept in the
proximate cause analysis of cases involving intervening acts.
Elevating foreseeability over sequence raised a second issue-exactly how
should foreseeability be applied in cases involving intervening acts. The resolution
of this issue is particularly important in determining whether the initial actor is the
proximate cause of the ultimate injury despite the presence of the intervening actor.
In answering this question, the courts have relied upon the person, type, and, in
particular, manner-within-the-risk concepts established by the seminal cases
discussed earlier.4" As evolved, the rule is that if the intervening act is itself a
foreseeable aspect of the risk created by the original, negligent defendant, then the
original defendant is not relieved of liability, i.e., is nonetheless the proximate cause
of the ultimate injury."
3 7
1d.
38See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 294-95:
This approach is obviously an arbitrary one, and of course not a mater of causal
connection at all, but only of convenience in limiting liability.
Artificial as it is, "direct" causation has been seized in quite a few cases as affording
some way of steering a course between the alternatives of limiting all liability to the
risk on the one hand, and unlimited liability on the other. But apart from the fact that
it offers a mechanical solution of a problem which is primarily and essentially one of
policy, it is not always easy to say whether new forces have intervened - as where for
example, a wind changes its direction - and in nearly all cases of "direct" causation it
is necessary to ignore as unimportant a number of external factors which have
intervened before the result. More important, however, is the objection that no really
successful and satisfactory limitation is provided which will eliminate the
consequences which most of us felt, more or less instinctively, to be going too far.
See also 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 174-76.
39KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 295-96; DOBBS, supra note 12, at 458.
4°See sources cited supra notes 19-33 and accompanying text.
4 1KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 306; DOBBS, supra note 12, at 460-61. As articulated by
Dobbs:
Foreseeable intervening causes. A ruling that an intervening actor is a superseding
cause embodies the dual conclusion that the intervening actor should be responsible
and that the original actor, in spite of his causal negligence, should not. The
intervening cause terminology makes the issue look as if it were only concerned about
the sequence of events and unrelated to issues of responsibility, foreseeability, or
scope of risk. But in contemporary law, when courts then ask what counts as a
superseding cause, they return to some form of the foreseeability inquiry. The rule is
that if the intervening cause itself is part of the risk negligently created by the
defendant, or if it is reasonably foreseeable at the time of the defendant's negligent
conduct, then it is not a superseding cause at all. In that case, the defendant is not
relieved of liability merely because some other person or force triggered the injury.
2008]
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Here again, Wagon Mound serves as a quintessential example: the original act of
negligence was spilling oil with a high flash point; the intervening act was creating a
spark that ignited cotton debris. The original actor was not relieved of liability
simply because another act intervened, but because the type and manner of the
ultimate injury were unforeseeable.42
A final example of the aspect of foreseeability relevant to result-within-the-risk
being applied in the intervening cause context-an example of particular importance
to this article-is provided by the seminal New York case of Derdiarian v. Felix
Contracting Corporation.4 3 In Derdiarian, the original defendant-a contractor-
negligently exposed the plaintiff-a worker-to risk by requiring him to work with
boiling enamel, while facing on-coming traffic, without adequately guarding the
construction site. Subsequently, a driver who suffered a seizure after failing to take
his anti-seizure medication drove through the site and struck the plaintiff. In holding
that the contractor was the proximate cause of the plaintiff s injury, the court focused
on manner-within-the-risk and concluded that the risk that rendered the original act
by the contractor negligent to begin with, i.e., injury by an out of control vehicle
driving through the unprotected site, was ultimately the manner in which the injury
was inflicted."
The wordy labels - superseding, intervening, efficient, independent - although almost
always invoked, turn out to be surplusage. The ultimate inquiry is merely whether the
intervening cause is foreseeable or whether the injury is within the scope of the risk
negligently created by the defendant.
Id. at 462.
42Wagon Mound, [1961] A.C. 388; DOBBS, supra note 12, at 455.
The Wagon Mound case should not be misunderstood. If the risk of fire had been
small but foreseeable and the defendant had had a useful purpose in discharging the
oil, the balance of risks and utilities might indicate that the defendant was not
negligent at all and hence not liable. On the other hand, if the defendant had no good
reason for discharging the oil, even a small risk of fire might be enough to justify a
finding that the defendant was negligent. In that case, the fact that fire was
foreseeable would indicate that the defendant should be liable for fire damage, even
though the risk was small.
Id.
43Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 671 (N.Y. 1980).
441d. at 671. The Court specifically rejected the argument that a driver losing control of
his car while suffering a seizure after failing to take anti-seizure medication was an
unforeseeable manner-within-the-risk as a matter of law:
By contrast, in the present case, we cannot say as a matter of law that defendant
Dickens' negligence was a superseding cause which interrupted the link between
Felix's negligence and plaintiff's injuries. From the evidence in the record, the jury
could have found that Felix negligently failed to safeguard the excavation site. A
prime hazard associated with such dereliction is the possibility that a driver will
negligently enter the worksite and cause injury to a worker. That the driver was
negligent, or even reckless, does not insulate Felix from liability. Nor is it decisive
that the driver lost control of the vehicle through a negligent failure to take
medication, rather than a driving mistake. The precise manner of the event need not
be anticipated. The finder of fact could have concluded that the foreseeable, normal
and natural result of the risk created by Felix was the injury of a worker by a car
entering the improperly protected work area.
Id. See also DOBBS, supra note 12, at 462.
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III. THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR TEST
A. Development and Application
The substantial factor test was first proffered as a test for proximate cause by
Jeremiah Smith in his seminal, early twentieth century article entitled "Legal Cause
in Actions of Tort."45 Smith began his article by defining the problem of causation
as follows: assuming wrongful conduct on the part of the defendant and legally
compensable damage suffered by the plaintiff, should the court "regard the
defendant's conduct as the cause, in the legal sense, of the damage to the plaintiff,
and .. .hold the defendant liable for such damage." 46 He then proceeded "to
consider the intrinsic correctness of the allege rule of non-liability for improbable
consequences."47 This rule was the most significant proximate cause rule of the
day-a nascent result-within-the-risk approach focused on the foreseeability, or
probability, of the consequences of negligence.4" Smith felt that such a rule relieved
negligent defendants in a way that, ultimately, was arbitrary. He asked, rhetorically,
"[s]hould the law absolve the defendant on the ground that the harmful consequence
which actually followed was not reasonably foreseeable, i.e., one which could not
reasonably have been anticipated .... .. "" and opined that it should not because,
ultimately, such a requirement mandated that the initial and resulting harm be
identical in nature.50
Finally, Smith focused his inquiry on the problem of what, then, should constitute
"a relation of cause and effect (such a causal relation) between defendant's Tort and
plaintiff's damage as is sufficient to maintain an action in Tort. . . ."" and concluded
that the defendant's tort must have been a "substantial factor" in producing the
resulting harm.52 Smith elaborated:
To constitute such causal relation between defendant's tort and plaintiff's
damage as will suffice to maintain an action of tort, the defendant's tort
must have been a substantial factor in producing the damage complained
of.
53
And further:
"Substantial" is not here meant to be understood as expressing merely the
idea of "actual," as opposed to "normal." It is meant to be understood as
expressing the idea of "considerable" or "of some magnitude," in
45Jeremiah Smith, Legal Cause in Actions of Tort, 25 HARV. L. REV. 103 (1911).
461d. at 103.
471d. at 223.
481d. at 223-52; see sources cited supra notes 11-18 and accompanying text.
49Smith, supra note 45, at 237-38.
5
°Id. at 238.
511d. at 309.
52Id.
531d. at 310.
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antithesis to "trifling," "slight," "trivial" or "minute." This notion of
"considerable" is the idea sometimes (though it may not be always)
conveyed by the word "substantial" in the statement, that, in order to
maintain an action for certain kinds of "nuisance," the damage must be
"substantial. 54
It should be noted that Smith did not appear to be advocating abandoning
foreseeability in the negligence analysis as a whole. Rather, he felt that
foreseeability determined the extent of the duty owed, and that initial duty and
resulting harm were substantially related if they were "of a like general character"55
or "related to the same persons or class of persons, and to the same subject matter, 56
or if the harm was brought about it the same general "mode" or manner."57
Smith's view was of academic interest only, until it was adopted by the
Restatement of Torts. 8 The Restatement appeared to make the substantial factor test
critical to all aspects of cause-actual (cause in fact) and proximate. Specifically,
Section 431 stated that an actor's negligent conduct was a legal cause of harm if "his
conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm."59 Section 433 listed
541d.
551d. at 238.
561d.
571d.
58RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §§ 431, 433 (1934). As described, with mild indignation, by
Prosser:
The late Jeremiah Smith once proposed as a test of proximate cause, that "the
defendant's tort must have been a substantial factor in producing the damage
complained of." This was picked up by the supreme court of Minnesota in a case of
merging fires presenting an issue of causation in fact, and was used by the court as a
substitute for the obviously inapplicable "but for" rule of causation. This case in turn
was taken over by the Restatement of Torts, which in its original form, adopted
"substantial factor" as a test not only of causation, but also of the "proximate." A
number of courts have followed this, apparently accepting the phrase as the answer to
all prayers and some sort of universal solvent.
KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 278 (footnotes omitted). See also 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note
2, at 180 ('This 'test' for limiting liability attracted no following in the courts, and only scant
attention from commentators, until the Restatement of Torts adopted it.").
59RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 431 (1934). The section read as follows:
§ 431. Legal Cause; What Constitutes
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
Comment a to Section 431 elaborated, in relevant part, as follows:
a. Distinction between substantial cause and cause in the philosophic sense. In order
to be a legal cause of another's harm, it is not enough that the harm would not have
occurred had the actor not been negligent .... [T]his is necessary but it is not of itself
sufficient. The negligence must also be a substantial factor as well as an actual factor
in bringing about the plaintiffs harm. The word "substantial" is used to denote the
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considerations important in determining whether negligent conduct was a substantial
factor in producing harm, including "lapse of time"' and "whether after the event
and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct it appeared highly
extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm."'6 1 Subsequently, in the
1948 revisions to the Restatement, the second factor quoted from Section 433 was
transferred to Section 435, entitled "Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of its
Occurrence. 62 As amended, Sections 431, 433, and 435 were carried over to the
Second Restatement of Torts.
63
fact that the defendant's conduct had such an effect in producing the harm as to lead
reasonable men to regard it as a cause, using that word in the popular sense in which
there always lurks the idea of responsibility ....
6°RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433(d) (1934). Section 433 read as follows:
§433. Considerations Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is a
Substantial Factor in Producing Harm.
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another
important in determining whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing
about harm to another:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent
of the effect which they have in producing it;
(b) whether after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent
conduct it appears highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm;
(c) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in
continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation
harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible;
(d) lapse of time.
611d. § 433(b).
62RESTATEMENT OF TORTS (Supplement) §§ 433, 435 (1948). It was thought, or hoped, by
some that this change would limit the application of the substantial factor test to cause in fact.
See, e.g., KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 278 ("The 1948 revision of the Restatement limited
its [i.e., the substantial factor test] application very definitely to cause in fact alone."); 4
HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 181-82, n. 45 ("Perhaps it was always the intent of the
Institute that 'substantial factor' be a test only of cause in fact .... "); Buckner, supra note 9 at
§ 7. Despite the changes worked by the 1948 revisions, however, the substantial factor test
has continued to play a significant role in the proximate cause analysis. See sources cited
infra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
6 3RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 433, 435 (1965). Currently, these sections
read as follows:
§ 431. What Constitutes Legal Cause
The actor's negligent conduct is a legal cause of harm to another if
(a) his conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about the harm, and
(b) there is no rule of law relieving the actor from liability because of the manner in
which his negligence has resulted in the harm.
§ 433. Considerations Important in Determining Whether Negligent Conduct is a
Substantial Factor in Producing Harm.
10152008]
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Perhaps because of the way the test came into being and assumed prominence,
there are no seminal cases establishing it, as there are with foreseeability based
proximate cause. There are, however, any number of instructive examples providing
insight into and illustrating application of the test.
An early illustration comes from Smith himself. In his article, he asks: "[i]f I
negligently frighten my neighbor's horse and he suddenly whirls around thereby
upsetting the carriage and throwing my neighbor out, can I escape liability because
the chances were that the horse, instead of whirling about, would have dashed the
carriage against the wall?"'  Analyzed within the context of his article, Smith
believed that the frightening of the house was a substantial factor in bringing about,
and the proximate cause of, the result because the neighbor against whom the
negligence was directed is the individual who was injured, and the initial negligence
and ultimate result were related in terms of "manner" or "mode", i.e., both were
related to the reaction of a negligently frightened horse. 65 Most importantly, Smith
felt that the fact that the specific reaction of the horse was not foreseeable should not
defeat a finding of proximate cause.'
A second, early illustration is based on Hill v. Winsor,67 as adapted by the first
Restatement. Pursuant to the Restatement adaptation, the illustration presumes that a
captain of a vessel "seeing men at work on a dock, may realize the necessity of
docking gently so as not to cause harm to any of the workman, but.., would not
expect a workman out of his sight to be upon a plank kept in position by the pressure
of two pilings. 68 It concludes that if "the negligent bumping of the ship against the
dock should cause the pilings to spring apart, thus releasing the board and causing
The following considerations are in themselves or in combination with one another
important in determining whether the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about
harm to another:
(a) the number of other factors which contribute in producing the harm and the extent
of the effect which they have in producing it;
(b) whether the actor's conduct has created a force or series of forces which are in
continuous and active operation up to the time of the harm, or has created a situation
harmless unless acted upon by other forces for which the actor is not responsible;
(c) lapse of time.
§ 435. Foreseeability of Harm or Manner of Its Occurrence
(1) If the actor's conduct is a substantial factor in bringing about harm to another, the
fact that the actor neither foresaw nor should have foreseen the extent of the harm or
the manner in which it occurred does not prevent him from being liable.
(2) The actor's conduct may be held not to be a legal cause of harm to another where
after the event and looking back from the harm to the actor's negligent conduct, it
appears to the court highly extraordinary that it should have brought about the harm.
64Smith, supra note 45, at 239.
651d. at 223-52.
66Id. at 238-39. See Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762, 765 (Conn. 1929).
6 7Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251(1875).
6 8RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433, comment e (1934).
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the workman to fall between the pilings, which as they sprang together crushed him,"
the negligence would be a substantial factor in bringing about, and thus a proximate
cause of, the result.69 Again staying within the context of Smith's article, the
analysis appears to be that the original duty and resulting damage were sufficiently
related in "manner" or "mode."7 In addition, the original negligence and resulting
harm were related in terms of "class of plaintiff'' and "nature" of harm."7"
One contemporary illustration of the substantial factor approach is Medcalf v.
Washington Heights Condominium Association.73  In Medcalf, the defendant
negligently maintained an electric buzzer system of an apartment building, with the
result that a tenant could not buzz-in the plaintiff, who had come to visit. While
waiting in the lobby, the plaintiff was attacked by a third party.74 The court felt that
the defendant's negligence was not a substantial factor in bringing about, i.e., was
not the proximate cause of, the result. The court first reiterated the view that "[t]he
substantial factor test reflects the inquiry fundamental to all proximate cause
questions, that is, whether the harm which occurred was of the same general nature
as the foreseeable risk created by the defendant's negligence."75 Then, focusing on
the class of plaintiff and the manner or mode of inflicting the injury, the court
concluded as a matter of law that the defendants "could not have reasonably foreseen
that a malfunctioning intercom system might provide a substantial incentive or
inducement for the commission of a violent criminal assault on their property by one
stranger upon another.
7 6
A final contemporary illustration is Derdiarian.77  As discussed earlier,
Derdiarian involved a plaintiff construction worker who was injured after being
struck by a driver, who failed to take anti-seizure medication and suffered a seizure
while driving. The defendant contractor, who negligently failed to protect the work-
site and exposed the plaintiff to on-coming traffic in the first place, argued that its
negligence was not the proximate cause because it could not foresee that a driver
would lose control of his car through a negligent failure to take medication.7 8 The
court held that the actions of the contractor were a substantial factor in bringing
about, and a proximate cause of, the result. The court premised its discussion on the
view that, while a defendant's negligence must be a "substantial cause" of the events
691d.
70Smith, supra note 45, at 313, illus. 6.
711d"
7 21d.
73Medcalf v. Wash. Heights Condo. Ass'n, 747 A.2d 532 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
7 4 1d. at 534.
751d. at 535.
761d. at 536.
77Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980).
781d. at 670. ("Defendant [contractor] now argues that plaintiff was injured in a freakish
accident, brought about solely by defendant [driver's] negligence, and therefore there was no
causal link, as a matter of law, between [contractor's] breach of duty and plaintiff's
injuries.").
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which produce an injury, the precise "manner" in which an accident happens need
not be foreseeable. Rather, the court concluded, the fact that the injury was
occasioned by a car entering the improperly protected work area was sufficient to
establish "legal" cause.79 It should also be noted that while the Court focused its
substantial factor analysis on mode or manner, class of plaintiff (a worker) and type
of harm (being burned or crushed) are also present.8 0
These illustrations provide some insight into the workings of the substantial
factor test, but they do not begin to convey the scope of its acceptance. On this
point, history provides a more accurate gauge.
B. Impact and Criticism of the Substantial Factor Test
Specifically, the fact that the Restatement adopted the substantial factor test was
an extremely significant development.8 Since that event, the test has been a part of
the proximate cause analysis in a plethora of cases in many jurisdictions.82
791d. at 671.
80Id.
81See sources cited infra notes 82-83 and accompanying text. See also 4 HARPER ET AL.,
supra note 2, at 180, 184, n.55; NY PJI 2:70 (2008).
8 2See, e.g., City of Fairbanks v. Nesbett, 432 P.2d 607 (Alaska 1967); State v. Abbott, 498
P.2d 712 (Alaska 1972); Herzberg v. White, 66 P.2d 253 (Ariz. 1937); Bigbee v. Superior
Court, 155 Cal. Rptr. 545 (Cal. Ct. App. 1979); United States v. Southern California Edison
Co., 413 F. Supp. 2d 1101 (E.D. Cal. 2006) (applying California law); Kinderavich v. Palmer,
15 A.2d 83 (Conn. 1941); Busko v. DeFilippo, 294 A.2d 510 (Conn. 1972); Winn v. Posades,
881 A.2d 524 (Conn. App. Ct. 2005); Gurguis v. Frankel, 888 A.2d 1083 (Conn. App. Ct.
2006); Heller v. D.W. Fish Realty Co., 890 A.2d 113 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006); Mitchell v.
Branch, 363 P.2d 969 (Haw. 1961); Panion v. United States, 385 F. Supp. 2d 1071 (D. Haw.
2005) (applying Hawaii law); Huey v. Milligan, 175 N.E.2d 698 (Ind. 1961); Eischeid v.
Dover Const., Inc., 217 F.R.D. 448 (N.D. Iowa 2003) (applying Iowa law); Chapman v.
Labone, 460 F. Supp. 2d 989 (S.D. Iowa 2006) (applying Iowa law); Bailey v. N. Am.
Refractories Co., 95 S.W.3d 868 (Ky. Ct. App. 2001); Wetmore v. MacDonald, Page, Schatz,
Fletcher & Co., 476 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2007) (applying Maine Law); Glinski v. Szylling, 99
N.W.2d 637 (Mich. 1959); Johnson v. Evanski, 22 N.W.2d 213 (Minn. 1946); Lietz v. N.
States Power Co., 718 N.W.2d 865 (Minn. 2006); Stuedemann v. Nose, 713 N.W.2d 79
(Minn. Ct. App. 2006); New Orleans & N.E.R. Co. v. Burge, 2 So. 2d 825 (Miss. 1941); Rein
v. Benchmark Const. Co., 865 So. 2d 1134 (Miss. 2004); Giles v. Moundridge Milling Co.,
173 S.W.2d 745 (Mo. 1943); Hildreth v. Key, 341 S.W.2d 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1960); Phillips
v. Stockman, 351 S.W.2d 464 (Mo. Ct. App. 1961); Maxfield v. Maxfield, 151 A.2d 226
(N.H. 1959); In re Haines, 808 A.2d 72 (N.H. 2002); Estate of Joshua T. v. State, 840 A.2d
768 (N.H. 2003); Carignan v. New Hampshire Intern. Speedway, Inc., 858 A.2d 536 (N.H.
2004); Rappaport v. Nichols, 156 A.2d I(N.J. 1959); Kulas v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co.,
196 A.2d 769 (N.J. 1964); Mitchell v. Friedman, 78 A.2d 417 (N.J. 1951); Derdiarian v. Felix
Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666 (N.Y. 1980); Nallan v. Helmsley-Spear, Inc., 407 N.E.2d
451 (N.Y. 1980); NY PJI 2:70; Brennen v. City of Eugene, 591 P.2d 719 (Or. 1979); Simon v.
Hudson Coal Co., 38 A.2d 259 (Pa. 1944); Hamil v. Bashline, 392 A.2d 1280 (Pa. 1978);
Feeney v. Disston Manor Personal Care Home, Inc., 849 A.2d 590 (Pa. 2004); Roche v. Ugly
Duckling Car Sales, Inc., 879 A.2d 785 (Pa. 2005); Lux v.-Gerald E. Ort Trucking, Inc., 887
A.2d 1281 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005); Jeffords v. Lesesne, 541 S.E.2d 847 (S.C. Ct. App. 2000);
Carney v. Goodman, 270 S.W.2d 572 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1954); Naifeh v. Valley Forge Life Ins.
Co., 204 S.W.3d 758 (Tenn. 2006); Willis v. Settle, 162 S.W.3d 169 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004);
Weaver v. McClintock-Trunksey Co., 111 P.2d 570 (Wash. 1941); State v. Meekins, 105 P.3d
1018 [Vol. 56:1003
HeinOnline -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  1018 2008
MIXING OIL AND WATER
Currently, it is clearly playing a major role in the proximate cause arena, second only
to the foreseeability based test of result-within-the-risk.83
This is all the more remarkable given the pointed, and often scathing, criticism
the test has suffered for its entire history-from its inception to the present. One
early critic was Leon Green. In a seminal article, Green issued a scathing critique of
not only the substantial factor test, but the use of the test as related to "legal cause,"
and the entire approach to legal cause as embodied in the Restatement of Torts. 4
Regarding legal cause generally, Green wrote, rather poetically:
If they had been inspired by all the imps that can bring confusion into the
administration of law, they could not have succeeded in their attempt in
that respect more overwhelmingly. "Proximate cause" in all its
philosophic splendor could never have visioned the verbalistic
magnificence of that synthetic pretender, "legal cause." And if any
considerable number of courts are gullible enough to attempt to write this
hodge-podge into the law, it will take a century to get rid of it."
He also called Section 433, which articulated considerations relevant to the
substantial factor test, "one of those amazing sections attempting to elaborate the
meaning of 'substantial factor,' a phrase already reduced to its lowest terms, and
valuable only as the 'reasonable man' is valuable for jury formula purposes."86
A second permanent critic was Prosser. In his treatise, Prosser states:
420 (Wash. Ct. App. 2005); Hatch v. Smail, 23 N.W.2d 460 (Wis. 1946); Schultz v. Brogan,
29 N.W.2d 719 (Wis. 1947); Pfeifer v. Standard Gateway Theater, 55 N.W.2d 29 (Wis. 1952);
Wintersberger v. Pioneer Iron & Metal Co., 94 N.W.2d 136 (Wis. 1959); Sampson v. Laskin,
224 N.W.2d 594 (Wis. 1975); Phelps v. Woodward Const. Co., 204 P.2d 179 (Wyo. 1949).
For additional, more extensive compilations, see Appendix, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 431, 433, 435 (Supp. 2007), and Buckner, supra note 9, at § 7 (1965 and Supp.).
83Buckner, supra note 9, at §§ 4-7; 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, 183-84 ("The most
generally used expressions appear to be those involving some form of the directness test; those
associated with foreseeability... ; and the [substantial factor] test.").
84Leon Green, The Torts Restatement, 29 ILL. L. REv. 582 (1934). Beyond criticizing the
articulation of any particular principle, Green seemed to oppose the very idea of drafting a
restatement:
The attempt to restate tort law in rigid black letter form was a serious mistake which
must be charged against the Institute itself rather than the Reporter and his associates.
Tort law is too liquid, too much a matter of processes, too growing and luxuriant to
submit to any such tight form of statement, and doubtless this accounts for much of
the grotesqueness which is found in the Restatement. Of course, the Reporter and his
associates might have satisfied themselves with a Restatement of the processes, but
that would have required the inclusion of a large percentage of procedures as opposed
to substantive law. In their efforts to carry out the commission which they were given
they have tried to separate the two and state only the substantive law of torts, with the
inevitable result that the product is a sort of dehydrated something, drained of nearly
all of the vitality found in such abundance in this, one of the most dynamic fields of
government.
Id. at 584-85.
"/d. at 607.
'
6 d. at 603.
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[W]hen the "substantial factor" is made to include all of the ill-defined
considerations of policy which go to limit liability once causation in fact
is found, it has no more definite meaning than "proximate cause," and it
becomes a hindrance rather than a help. It is particularly unfortunate in so
far as it suggests that the questions involved are only questions of
causation, obscuring all other issues, and as it tends to leave to the jury
matters which should be decided by the court.
87
A third prominent critique is Harper. Harper states that:
"Substantial factor" as a test of proximate cause is no more helpful than
proximate cause itself. If defendant's wrong is a substantial cause in fact
of plaintiff's harm, recovery should not be denied because of any further
consideration of cause. To be sure recovery may be prevented by other
kinds of considerations such as limitations on the scope of duty. But the
term substantial factor is no more appropriate to describe these
considerations than is any of the other cause formulas . 88
A final prominent critic is Dobbs. Through his critique of the substantial factor
test is not the most scathing, it is, perhaps, the most dismissive. In his treatise, in a
section entitled, "Formal tests: substantial factor, continuing sequence and
intervening cause," Dobbs states:
The term proximate cause by itself explains nothing, not even the kind of
evidence to be considered. In an effort to define the term, courts have at
various times invoked a litany of equally impenetrable phrases, some of
them simply opaque, others actively misleading. Some of those that are
not in common use can be left to a footnote.8 9
In a supporting footnote, Dobbs concludes:
At one time, some authorities said that to be a proximate cause, the
defendant's conduct must be a substantial factor in causing the plaintiffs
harm. That term explains nothing about what to look for and runs the risk
of confusing cause in fact issues to which it is sometimes applied in lieu
of the but-for test.9
87 KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 278 (citing Green, supra note 84, at 602); William
Prosser, The Minnesota Court on Proximate Cause, 21 MINN. L. REV. 19 (1936). Though first
articulated as early as the 1930s, these criticisms of the substantial factor test have been
carried forward in near verbatim fashion. See, e.g., NY PJI 2:70:
As Dean Prosser suggests with respect to substantial factor as applied to the fact of
causation alone it is of considerable assistance, but with respect to policy
considerations, such as foreseeability or intervening cause, which go to limit liability
once causation is found, it can have the effect of obscuring the issue and leaving to the
jury matters that should be decided by the court.
884 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 182 (citing Green, supra note 84; C. MORRIS & C. R.
MORRIS, MORRIS ON TORTS 174 (2d ed. 1980)).
89DOBBS, supra note 12, at 452.
9Id. at 452, n.2.
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Yet, despite the stature of the critics and the well-informed and well-reasoned
nature of the criticism, the substantial factor test as a measure of proximate cause has
not only endured, but, in many jurisdictions, prevailed.91
IV. RECONCILING THE SUBSTANTIAL FACTOR AND RESULT-WITHIN-THE-RISK
APPROACHES TO PROXIMATE CAUSE
The perpetuation of a dispute over something so fundamental as the approach to
the proximate cause component of the negligence cause of action would certainly
have a negative impact on the tort system as a whole. Given the prominence of the
negligence action and the critical function of the proximate cause component to that
action, the ongoing nature of the dispute would leave jurisdictions uncertain with
respect to, and at odds with one another over, appropriate limits on liability, and
beyond this, notions of fundamental fairness in terms of compensation for significant
injuries. It is, perhaps, such concerns that prompted the nature of the criticism that
proponents of the dueling approaches have leveled against one another. 92
These negative concerns, however, do not appear to have materialized. Rather,
while the approaches are irreconcilable from a theoretical perspective, as applied by
the courts the proximate cause analysis grounded in substantial factor appears to be
yielding the same results with respect to liability as the proximate cause analysis
grounded in foreseeabilty. 93 Beyond this, a significant amount of common ground
has emerged in the means that have yielded these consistent ends.94
Two significant reasons lie behind this phenomenon. The first is that, at their
origins, the two approaches may have had more in common than was initially
91See sources cited supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text.
921n this regard, the observations of the Court in Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762 (Conn.
1929), are as relevant today as they were nearly a century ago:
Few subjects in the law in the past 30 years have been written upon more extensively
by the greatest thinkers in the filed of torts than that of "Proximate Cause." These
writers differ widely in their reasoning and conclusions, but are in agreement in the
conclusion that judicial reasoning and discussion of this subject has left our law in a
most uncertain and unsound condition. They have, we think, made their
demonstration so complete that it is all the more regrettable that they so widely differ
in their theories and methods of reasoning. It is due to their lack of reasonable
agreement, and to the treatment of the subject by most of the writers in a way
altogether too difficult of understanding and to abstract for presentation to a jury, that
the courts have as a rule failed to give the consideration to the written discussion of
these eminent authorities in the field of torts which their wealth of material so richly
deserved.
Id. at 764-65 (emphasis added).
93Compare cases categorized in section 5 (a-c) of Buckner, supra note 9, with cases in
section 7. See 4 HARPER ET AL., supra note 2, at 182:
As to the language in vogue in different states, virtually every one of the tests [for
proximate cause] has had some currency among the courts of the different states, both
in charges to the jury and in judicial opinions. And many states may be said to
"adopt" one "rule" at one time, and another "rule" at another time. The fact is that in a
great number of situations it makes very little difference what test is used.
Id.
94See sources cited infra notes 95-139 and accompanying test.
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realized. Throughout the course of its development, and particularly since the advent
of Palsgraf and Wagan Mound, much had been written about the aspects of result-
person, type and manner-relevant to the result-within-the-risk approach.95 What
has passed largely without comment, however, is that these same components of
result have always been relevant to the substantial factor approach.
It is true that Smith did not discuss aspects of result in the section (the third) of
his seminal article articulating the substantial factor test itself.96 He did, however,
reaffirm the relevance of person, type and manner to the proximate cause analysis in
the section (the second) of his article dealing with his criticism of foreseeability
based rules of non-liability for improbable consequences.9" Specifically, in
discussing the relationship between initial negligent conduct and ultimate result, he
stated, "[u]ndoubtedly they both must relate to the same persons or class of persons,
and to the same subject matter." 98 He also stated that the negligent actor should not
be able to "escape liability on the ground that he could not foresee the precise
manner in which the harm would occur, nor the exact nature of the harm. . .. "99
These statements can be interpreted in various ways. Smith was certainly
arguing against approaching proximate cause from a perspective of specific
foreseeability. "
At the same time, he recognizes the relevance of foreseeability and may be
suggesting that foreseeability be considered an aspect of substantiality for purposes
of substantial factor, or that foreseeable manner, interpreted broadly, serve as some
sort of outside limit on substantial factor. In any event, as is the case with result-
within-the-risk, the aspects of result relevant to the substantial factor approach to
proximate cause appear to be person, type, and manner.
The second reason for the finding of common ground between the result-within-
the-risk and substantial factor approaches to proximate cause is that they have
followed opposite, but ultimately complementary, tracks in their development; over
the course of their development, the substantial factor approach has narrowed and the
result-within-the-risk approach has broadened. In a very real sense, the two
approaches have moved toward one another.
Historically, the main problem with the substantial factor approach was that it
was extremely broad-even without criteria-to the point that any negligent act that
was a but for cause of a particular harm would automatically be deemed to be its
proximate cause.' Perhaps nothing illustrates this point better than the fact that the
Restatement of Torts, in adopting the substantial factor approach to proximate
95See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 12, at 454-58, 463-70.
96Smith, supra note 45, at 303-27.
9 7Id. at 223-52.
981d. at 238.
9 9 1d.
ee9Id.
'
01See sources cited supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
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cause, l1 2 originally illustrated the application of the approach by referring to the
situation presented in Polemis. °3
Specifically, in the comment on Clause (b) of Section 433 in the 1934
Restatement, the reporter writes:
So, a stevedore loading a vessel may have no reason to expect that the fall
of a plank into the hold will do more than damage the vessel or cargo
immediately below; but the court, which knows from the accident itself
that there were explosive fumes in the hold, may find nothing highly
extraordinary in the fact that the fall of the plank caused metal to come in
contact with metal causing a spark which ignited these fumes and started a
fire which consumed the whole vessel." 4
In retrospect, given the policies underlying the doctrine, a finding of proximate
cause pursuant to the facts of Polemis appears difficult to justify and undermines any
approach that leads to such a finding. °5
By 1965, however, Polemis had been dropped as in illustration of substantial
factor,"°6 suggesting that the facts of the case would illustrate "extraordinary"
manner, 10 7 and otherwise indicating a narrowing of what constitutes substantial
factor. Beyond this, the facts of Polemis never seemed to support a finding of
substantial factor to begin with: the class of plaintiffs threatened by the negligence
act (those working below deck) differed from the plaintiff actually injured (the
owners of the ship); the nature of the damage (injury to a workman from being struck
as opposed to injury to a ship consumed by fire) also differed.'0 8
A contemporary illustration of the narrowing of substantial factor is found in
Medcalf'° As noted earlier, Medcalf involved a plaintiff who was attacked in a
lobby of a building and then sued the owner for negligent maintenance of a non-
working buzzer."0
Viewed most broadly, one of the functions of a buzzer and intercom system is to
prevent injury caused by criminal activity, the plaintiff was injured by criminal
102See sources cited supra notes 58-63 and accompanying text.
'
03RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 433 cmt. e (1934).
'°4id.
105 See sources cited supra notes 35-39 and accompanying text; KEETON ET AL., supra note
1, at 295 n.24 (citing Arthur Goodhart, The Unforeseeable Consequences of a Negligent Act,
39 YALE L.J. 449 (1930); Arthur Goodhart, The Imaginary Necktie and the Rule of Re
Polemis, 68 L.Q. REV. 514 (1952); Arthur Goodhart, The Brief Life Story of the Direct
Consequence Rule in English Tort Law, 53 VA. L. REV. 857 (1967); Warren Seavey, Mr.
Justice Cardozo and the Law of Torts, 52 HARv. L. REV. 372, 48 YALE L.J. 390, 39 COLUM. L.
REV. 20 (1939); Douglas Payne, The "Direct" Consequences of a Negligent Act, 5 CURR. LEG.
PROB. 189 (1952).
106RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 cmt. d (1965).
10 7RESTATEMENTr (SECOND) OF TORTS § 435 (1965).
'
08See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
1°gMedcalf v. Wash. Heights Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 747 A.2d 532 (Conn. App. Ct. 2000).
'"°See sources cited supra notes 73-76 and accompanying text.
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activity, and therefore the negligent maintenance of the buzzer was a substantial
factor in both the but for and proximate cause sense. Viewed more narrowly,
however, and defining substantiality with reference to class of persons and limiting it
with reference to foreseeable manner, the negligent maintenance of the buzzer does
not play a substantial role in the proximate cause of the injury. The buzzer and
intercom system is designed to protect occupants of the building, not visiting
"strangers"; the manner of injury the system seeks to avoid is a stranger gaining
access to the building and attacking an occupant, not a stranger attacking another
stranger before either has gained entrance.
Interpreted narrowly, this substantial factor analysis of Medcalf is completely
consistent with a result-within-the-risk analysis, to wit, the foreseeable person-
within-the-risk of a defective intercom system is a building occupant, not a visiting
stranger; the foreseeable, general manner of injury is attack by an intruder, not a
stranger lurking outside.
Regarding result-within-the-risk, historically, the fear with foreseeability based
proximate cause is that it operates too narrowly and relieves defendants that should
be held liable. 1 This concern was noted by Smith when he wondered why a
defendant who spooked a horse should escape liability because the frightened animal
reacted one way (whirling about) as opposed to another (bolting).' 12 This concern
was also born out in the earlier, seminal result-within-the-risk cases previously
noted. Specifically, Palsgraf relieved the defendant railroad of liability even thought
its conduct foreseeably endangered patrons and Ms. Polsgraf was a nearby patron.'
Wagon Mound relieved the defendant ship owners of liability even though their
negligently spilled oil destroyed the dock that was otherwise threatened.' 14
For the past several decades, however, the notion of what is foreseeable appears
to have broadened. Ironically, this process may have begun with Wagon Mound
itself. Regarding the case, Dobbs cautions that if the defendant had had nojustification for discharging the oil, "even a small risk of fire might be enough tojustify a finding that the defendant was negligent. In that case, the fact that fire was
foreseeable would indicate that the defendant should be liable for fire damage, even
though the risk was small." 115 This was precisely the situation in Wagon Mound
1,116 which, six years after Wagon Mound, involved damage to ships docked at the
same wharf. 117 As described by Prosser, "[t]his time there was evidence justifying
the conclusion that the defendants were, or should have been, aware that there was
11
'See, e.g., Smith, supra note 45, at 223-52; See sources cited supra notes 47-50 and
accompanying text.
12Smith, supra note 45, at 239; See sources cited supra note 64 and accompanying text.
1 See sources cited supra notes 19-24 and accompanying text.
114 See sources cited supra notes 25-27, 42 and accompanying text.
1 5 DoBBS, supra note 12, at 455.
tt 6Overseas Tankship (U.K.), Ltd. v. Miller S.S. Co. (Wagon Mound I1), [1967] 1 A.C.
617 (P.C. 1967) (appeal taken from Sup. CT. NSW).
1024 [Vol. 56:1003
HeinOnline -- 56 Clev. St. L. Rev.  1024 2008
MIXING OIL AND WATER
some slight risk that the oil on the water would be ignited, although it was very
unlikely.""'  Unlikely or not, the defendants were found liable." 9
Prosser felt that Wagon Mound 1I wrongly minimized the significance of
foreseeability in the proximate cause context, stating that "[t]he effect comes close to
letting the Polemis case in again by the back door, since cases will obviously be
quite infrequent in which there is not some recognizable slight risk of this
character."' 12 By contrast, Dobbs felt that Wagon Mound II was not a retreat from
Wagon Mound, but rather "nothing more that a perfectly logical application of the
rules of proximate cause." "2' Regardless of the perspective taken, however, it seems
clear that Wagon Mound 11 broadens the notion of foreseeability in the proximate
cause context.
This has occurred in a plethora of other contexts as well; two notable ones are
person-within-the-risk in the context of bystanders injured by defective products and
manner-within-the-risk in the context of intervening criminal acts. Regarding the
former, for much of its history, liability for defective products did not extend to
bystanders, i.e., courts considering the issue reasoned that manufactures owed no
duty to bystanders, or that bystanders were not persons-within-the-risk for proximate
cause purposes.'22 The Restatement of Torts (Second) itself left the issue open.'23
Beginning in the 1970's, however, this began to change. Currently, the
overwhelming majority of courts'24 (and legislatures)'25 extend recovery for defective
'
8 KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 296.
l"9Wagon Mound 11, 1 A.C. 617.
12 0KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 296.
12'DOBBS, supra note 12, at 455 n.9.
122See, e.g., Winnett v. Winnett, 310 N.E.2d 1 (Ill. 1974); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS § 402A, cmt. o (1965).
123RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (stating as a caveat that "[tihe Institute
expresses no opinion as to whether the rules ... may not apply ... to harm to persons other
than users or consumers").
124See, e.g., Elmore v. Am. Motors Co., 451 P.2d 84, 89 (Cal. 1969) (providing protection
to bystanders from reasonably foreseeable product defects); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co.,
366 So. 2d 80, 92 (Fla. 1976) (applying strict liability to bystanders within the range of harm);
Embs v. Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 528 S.W.2d 703, 705 (Ky. 1975) (finding no substantial
reason for not protecting bystanders from defective products); Osborne v. Int'l Harvester Co.,
688 P.2d 390, 397 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (extending the doctrine of strict liability to bystanders
injured by unreasonably dangerous products), review dismissed, 691 P.2d 483 (Or. 1984). See
also Wasik v. Borg, 423 F.2d 44, 47 (2d Cir. 1970); Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F.
Supp. 776, 780-81 (N.D. Ind. 1969); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885
(Alaska 1979); Sullivan v. Green Mfg. Co., 575 P.2d 811, 816 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977); Cottom
v. McGuire Funeral Serv., 262 A.2d 807, 809 (D.C. 1970); Rindlisbaker v. Wilson, 519 P.2d
421, 428 (Idaho 1974); Mieher v. Brown, 278 N.E.2d 869, 874 (I11. 1972) rev'd on other
grounds, 301 N.E.2d 307 (Ill. 1973); Walker v. Clark Equip. Co., 320 N.W.2d 561, 562 (Iowa
1982); Weber v. Fidelity & Cas. Ins. Co., 250 So. 2d 754, 755 (La. 1971); Piercefield v.
Remington Arms Co., 133 N.W.2d 129, 135 (Mich. 1965); Coco-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reeves,
486 So. 2d 374, 378 (Miss. 1986); Giberson v. Ford Motor Co., 504 S.W.2d 8, 11 (Mo.
1974); Tirrell v. Navistar Int'l, Inc., 591 A.2d 643, 649-50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.), cert.
denied, 599 A.2d 166 (N.J. 1991); Codling v. Paglia, 298 N.E.2d 622, 628 (N.Y. 1973); Jones
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products to bystanders, thus, at least in effect, considering bystanders foreseeable for
the purpose of the person-within-the-risk proximate cause analysis.
Regarding the latter, historically, courts held intervening criminal acts
unforeseeable as a matter of law, which, in effect, rendered them unforeseeable for
purposes of manner-within-the-risk proximate cause and relieved the original
negligent actor of liability.'26 A seminal case here is Watson v. Kentucky,'27 which
relieved a defendant who negligently spilled a tank car of gasoline of liability for an
explosion because an intervening criminal actor threw a match into the gasoline. 8
By the end of the twentieth century, however, courts were abandoning this doctrine
and expanding manner-within-the-risk to include criminal acts that were foreseeable
from the perspective of the original, negligent defendant. 129
In any event, regardless of which particular component of result is focused upon,
the notion of what is foreseeable for result-within-the-risk purposes has broadened.
Indeed, there would seem to be little doubt that the criticism implicet in Smith's
earlier referenced hypothetical regarding a frightened horse is no longer justified; 3 °
as presently applied, a defendant who negligently frightened his neighbor's horse
would be the result-within-the-risk base proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries
regardless of whether the horse whirled, bolted, or reacted in any way whatsoever.
Two ultimate examples of the reconciliation between the substantial factor and
result-within-the-risk approaches to proximate cause come from two cases noted
earlier-Hill v. Winsor'3 1 and Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting."2 Indeed, coming as
v. White Motor Corp., 401 N.E.2d 223, 226 230 (Ohio Ct. App. 1978); Moss v. Polyco, Inc.
522 P.2d 622, 626 (Okla. 1974); Webb v. Zem, 220 A.2d 853, 854 (Pa. 1966); Russell v.
Bishop, No. 88, 1986 WL 653, *2, 3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 7, 1986); Darryl v. Ford Motor Co.,
440 S.W. 630, 633 (Tex. 1969); Howes v. Hansen 201 N.W.2d 825, 828 (Wis. 1972).
.
25See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-572m (West 1991) (defining claimant for
products liability purposes); IDAHO CODE ANN. § [6-1402] 6-1302 (4) (1990) (defining
claimant as any person or entity that suffers harm); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 735, 5/13-213 (a) (3)
(1993); IND. CODE ANN. § 33-1-1.5-2 (LexisNexis 1995); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60- 3302 (c,d)
(Supp. 1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 411.300-320 (LexisNexis 1992); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:2800.53 (4) (West 1991) (defining claimant as any person or entity that asserts a claim);
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.760 (West 1988); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-l(b) (1) (West 1987);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406 (LexisNexis 1995) (providing a jury instruction that places
liability on the supplier for injuries to both reasonably foreseeable consumers of the product
and persons in the general vicinity when the product is used); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2307.71(A) (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.920(3) (1993) (declaring that liability for
unreasonably dangerous product must be constructed according to § 402A); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 29-28-102(6) (1980); TEx. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 82.001 (Vernon 1995); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 7.72.010(5) (West 1992).
'
26See, e.g., DOBBS, supra note 12, at 470-74 ("In an earlier era, courts tended to hold that
intervening criminal acts were unforeseeable as a matter of law.").
127Watson v. Ky.. and Ind. Bridge and R.R. Co., 126 S.W. 146 (Ky. 1910).
1281d.
129DOBBS, supra note 12, at 472 (citing Britton v. Wooten, 817 S.W.2d 443, 449 (Ky.
1991) ("This archaic doctrine has been rejected everywhere.").
130Smith, supra note 45, at 239.
13'Hill v. Winsor, 118 Mass. 251 (1875).
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they do from opposite ends of the historical timeline, the opinions, and the
commentary they have inspired, can be said to frame the journey of reconciliation.
Hill involved a defendant who negligently docked a tug boat and injured a
workman by crushing him between the piles of a bridge, as opposed to simply
knocking him down.'33 As discussed earlier, the first Restatement used this case to
illustrate what considerations were important in determining when negligent
conducted constituted proximate cause as defined by substantial factor. 134  Much
later, Prosser discusses Hill as a seminal case establishing "general type," as opposed
to "precise nature," as the focus of the manner-within-the-risk component of
proximate cause.'35
Drediarian involved a defendant who negligently failed to protect a construction
site, with the result that a workman was injured by a driver who drove through the
site after failing to take anti-seizure medication and suffering a seizure. 16 As noted
earlier, the case is a seminal, contemporary example of foreseeable intervening cause
in the context of manner-within-the-risk proximate cause."' Even Dobbs, who is
utterly dismissive of the substantial factor approach, discusses the case at some
length, and with seeming approval, in analyzing foreseeable intervening causes.'38
Yet, Drediarian is clearly following a contemporary version of the substantial factor
approach to proximate cause. 39  Nonetheless, as applied, the substantial factor
approach is completely consistent with, and yields the same results as, the
foreseeability based result-within-the-risk approach to proximate cause.
V. CONCLUSION
From one perspective-the perspective of their theoretical origins-the result-
within-the-risk view of proximate cause, with its focus on foreseeability, and the
substantial factor view, with its focus on significance, are irreconcilable. This
apparent irreconcilability has caused consternation and confusion..
132Derdiarian v. Felix Contracting Corp., 414 N.E.2d 666, 671 (N.Y. 1980).
133Winsor, 118 Mass. at 251.
134See sources cited supra notes 67-69 and accompanying text.
135KEETON ET AL., supra note 1, at 299. Prosser was concerned that Hill and other cases
were extreme in their expansive interpretation of foreseeability, stating:
Some "margin of leeway" has to be left for the unusual and the unexpected. But this
has opened a very wide door; and the courts have taken so much advantage of the
leeway that it can scarcely be doubted that a great deal of what the ordinary person
would regard as freakish, bizarre, and unpredictable has crept within the bounds of
liability by the simple device of permitting the jury to foresee at least its very broad,
and vague, general outlines. This becomes, in the courtroom, a matter for the skill of
the advocate who can lay stress upon broad, general and very simple things, and stay
away from all complications of detail.
Id. (citations omitted).
'
36Derdiarian, 414 N.E.2d 666.
137See sources cited supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
138DOBBS, supra note 12, at 462. See sources cited supra notes 89-90 and accompanying
text.
'
39See sources cited supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
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From another perspective, however-the perspective of present application-the
two approaches may be viewed as two means to a harmonious and important end.
Whether approached from the means of substantial factor, with its focus on
significance as qualified by foreseeable manner, or the means of result-within-the-
risk, with its focus on narrow concepts of foreseeable person, type and manner
within-the-risk and the broadening of these concepts over time, the end appears to be
the finding of common ground for purposes of the proximate cause analysis.
If an accord has been achieved in practice, if the views have been reconciled in
application, it would be no small achievement. It would mean, finally, that there is
agreement on what aspects of result constitute the critical focus of the proximate
cause inquiry. 4 '
14°As noted nearly eighty years ago in Mahoney v. Beatman, 147 A. 762, 764 (Conn.
1929):
The desirability from a practical standpoint of a workable rule for determining the
legal consequences resulting from a negligent act, at once understandable and
sufficiently accurate in its applicability to enable a trial court to so present it to a jury
that they may grasp it, has been growingly important as the changes in economic
conditions have multiplied so vastly the instances of the problems in what the courts
have denominated "proximate causation."
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